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 This paper makes the case that methodol-
ogy is a cornerstone of the advance of common 
law constitutionalism both within jurisdictions 
and transnationally. Common law methods, in-
cluding interpretive presumptions and reason-
ing by unwritten principles, are central to an ap-
preciation of the development of common law 
constitutionalism. Moreover, methodological 
practices present a more fruitful basis for lasting 
common law constitutionalism in several re-
spects. Firstly, methods have the potential to 
survive legislative winds of change. Path de-
pendence (in the sense that legal decisions and 
outcomes are shaped by the historical sequence 
of legal developments) points to the retention of 
techniques through embedded judicial practice. 
Secondly, methods also travel well across bor-
ders and thereby enable further development of 
the transnational dimension of common law con-
stitutionalism. Common law methods are capa-
ble of adaptation across borders; they are less 
susceptible to barriers erected by claims of na-
tional or constitutional identity. Against this 
background, I argue that debates about the mer-
its and impact of common law constitutionalism 
must contain and respond to accounts of the 
methods engaged in common law constitutional-
ist reasoning.
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 Cet article avance que la méthodologie est 
une pierre angulaire dans le développement du 
constitutionnalisme de common law, tant au 
sein des juridictions particulières qu’au niveau 
transnational. Les méthodes de la common law, 
incluant les présomptions interprétatives et le 
raisonnement par principes non écrits, sont es-
sentielles pour comprendre le développement du 
constitutionnalisme de common law. De plus, les 
pratiques méthodologiques constituent une base 
plus féconde pour un constitutionnalisme de 
common law durable à plusieurs égards. Premiè-
rement, ces méthodes ont le potentiel de sur-
vivre aux vents de changement législatifs. La dé-
pendance du cheminement (dans le sens que les 
décisions et les résultats juridiques sont façon-
nés par la séquence historique des développe-
ments juridiques) illustre la sauvegarde des 
techniques à travers la pratique judiciaire inté-
grée. Deuxièmement, les méthodes traversent 
aisément les frontières et permettent donc de 
plus amples développements de la dimension 
transnationale du constitutionnalisme de com-
mon law. Les méthodes de common law sont ca-
pables d’adaptation au-delà des frontières; elles 
sont moins vulnérables aux barrières érigées par 
des revendications d’identité nationale ou cons-
titutionnelle. Face à ce contexte, nous soutenons 
que les débats sur les bénéfices et les impacts du 
constitutionnalisme de common law doivent in-
clure et interagir avec les composantes des mé-
thodes appliquées dans le raisonnement consti-
tutionnaliste de common law. 
 




Introduction  343 
I.  The Scope of the Article: The Methods of Common Law 
Constitutionalism in Transnational Perspective 344 
II.  Common Law Constitutionalism 347 
III.  Endurance 351 
A. Commonality Between Common Law and Statutory  
Methods 352 
B. Path Dependence 354 
IV.  Portability 360 
A. Common Law Unity 360 
B. Principle of Legality and Implication of Constitutional  
Principles 364 
 1.  Principle of Legality 365 
 2.  Implication of Constitutional Principles 370 
V.  Coherence and Common Law Methods 375 
Conclusion 377 
 




 Methods are a cornerstone of the advance of common law constitution-
alism, both within jurisdictions and in the transnational sphere. Common 
law methods, including interpretive presumptions and reasoning by un-
written or implied principles, are central to an appreciation of the develop-
ment of common law constitutionalist thought. Common law constitution-
alism has attracted renewed attention as a result of the resurgence of com-
mon law constitutional rights in United Kingdom jurisprudence, alongside 
the continued invocation of unwritten constitutional principles in other 
common law jurisdictions. Commentary on common law constitutionalism 
has at times discounted the increased reference to unwritten norms by 
stressing the limitations on their substantive content. This claim suggests 
that only a limited number of rules and principles are referenced and that 
they possess limited normative force, particularly over legislation.1 Yet, 
common law constitutionalism remains a prominent feature of constitu-
tional law in anglophone countries. This article argues that common law 
methodology is an integral feature of the continuing relevance of common 
law constitutionalism. Accordingly, regardless of the limitations of sub-
stantive common law norms, the methods employed in common law consti-
tutionalism are crucial in appreciating the endurance and influence of  
common law constitutionalism.  
 Methodological practices provide a fruitful basis for lasting common 
law constitutionalism in several respects. First, methods have the potential 
to survive legislative winds of change. Path dependence (in the sense that 
legal decisions and outcomes are shaped by historical legal developments) 
points to the retention of techniques through embedded judicial practice. 
Second, methodologies travel well across borders and thereby enable the 
growth of the transnational dimension of common law constitutionalism. 
Common law methods are capable of transferral and adaptation across ju-
risdictions. While methods may be contested, they often do not carry the 
baggage of substantive norms and are less susceptible to barriers erected 
by claims of national or constitutional identity. Both characteristics speak 
to resilience or endurance—the ability to persist beyond barriers, whether 
temporal or jurisdictional. In short, methodological techniques are gener-
ally better able than substantive norms to move across temporal and spa-
tial boundaries. Against this background, I argue that debates about the 
merits and impact of common law constitutionalism must include and re-
spond to accounts of the methodologies of common law constitutionalist 
reasoning.  
 
1   See e.g. Richard Clayton, “The Empire Strikes Back: Common Law Rights and the Hu-
man Rights Act” [2015] 1 Public L 3 at 7–12; Mark Elliott, “Beyond the European Con-
vention: Human Rights and the Common Law” (2015) 68 Current Leg Probs 85 at 88–
90. 
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 To explore these ideas, this paper proceeds along the following path. 
Part I sets out the scope of the article, outlining what is meant by method-
ology and explaining the value of a transnational perspective on the meth-
ods of common law constitutionalism. Part II then provides a brief account 
of common law constitutionalism. Here I note the systemic, historical, and 
geographical dimensions of the common law, as well as the core character-
istics of common law constitutionalism. Part III then addresses the factors 
that facilitate the endurance of common law constitutionalist practices by 
discussing the unifying threads between common law and statute and the 
influence of path dependence in preserving the impact of common law 
methods. The transnational relevance of common law constitutionalist rea-
soning and discourse is then discussed in Part IV, with particular attention 
to the use of the principle of legality and the implication of unwritten con-
stitutional principles in a range of constitutional settings. I suggest that 
these two interpretive techniques work to sustain a close constitutional re-
lationship across common law jurisdictions, reducing the impact of differ-
ences occasioned by written and unwritten constitutionalism. Methodolog-
ical practices are accordingly at least as pivotal as substantive principles 
in sustaining the endurance and transnational reach of common law con-
stitutionalism. Part V then explores the impact of these methodological 
practices on the coherence of the common law. This section questions 
whether the advance and influence of the techniques employed by courts 
in common law constitutionalist reasoning disturb the coherent relation-
ship between substance and method within the common law. I suggest that 
transnational engagement on common law constitutionalism may assist in 
ensuring coherence within the common law constitution.  
I. The Scope of the Article: The Methods of Common Law Constitution-
alism in Transnational Perspective 
 The article is primarily prompted by renewed attention to common law 
constitutionalism—particularly common law rights—in the UK, and some 
of the trends that have emerged in the academic discourse on this resur-
gence.2 The UK Supreme Court has, in recent years, placed increased reli-
ance on constitutional rights developed at common law, asserting the abil-
ity of the common law to protect fundamental rights alongside the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights as applied through the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA).3 Yet, significant doubts have been expressed in the UK 
literature regarding the content and scope of the rights available under the 
 
2   See e.g. Kennedy v Information Commissioner, [2014] UKSC 20 at para 46 [Kennedy]; R 
(Osborn) v Parole Board, [2013] UKSC 61 [Osborn]. On the resurgence of common law 
rights, see Roger Masterman & Se-shauna Wheatle “A Common Law Resurgence in 
Rights Protection?” [2015] 1 Eur HRL Rev 57. 
3   See e.g. Osborn, supra note 2; Kennedy, supra note 2; R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor, 
[2017] UKSC 51 [UNISON]. 
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common law constitution.4 Mark Elliott, for instance, voices the concern 
that common law rights lack sufficient precision and scope to effectively 
replace a written bill of rights in the form of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Elliott therefore maintains that judicially recognized com-
mon law rights “occupy a terrain substantially narrower than that occupied 
by the Convention rights.”5  The unwritten nature of common law rights 
has also elicited the caution that “[e]ven where common law rights have 
been established for many years, the absence of express words means that 
these rights are less certain in scope, their underlying justification often 
unclear.”6 Even in the wake of the resurgence of common law rights in UK 
courts, enthusiasm for this reawakening has been tempered by the caution 
that common law rights have a “traditional limited status” in UK law7 and 
that the recent cases relate to a narrow area of law regarding issues of open 
justice and fairness.8   
 This skeptical view prompts a consideration of whether we ought to re-
flect on the potential of common law constitutionalism beyond the substan-
tive norms—including rights and general principles—that have been artic-
ulated in the courts. Arguably, much of the value of common law constitu-
tionalist adjudication lies in the methods employed by judges in such 
cases.9 Methods speak to the process of developing a norm and applying it 
to the facts, rather than the substance of the norm applied or the resulting 
decision.10 Methodology therefore encompasses the techniques for deter-
mining the meaning of norms, the application of norms, and their relation-
ship to each other. Within common law constitutional adjudication, such 
techniques include the vaunted principle of legality, which has played a 
prominent role in common law constitutionalism in Australia and the UK, 
and the implication of constitutional principles, which has been influential 
in a range of common law countries including Canada and the jurisdictions 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
 
4   See discussion in Thomas Fairclough, “The Reach of Common Law Rights” in Mark El-
liott & Kirsty Hughes, eds, Common Law Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2020) 295. 
5   Elliott, supra note 1 at 88. 
6   Paul Bowen, “Does the Renaissance of Common Law Rights Mean that the Human 
Rights Act 1998 Is Now Unnecessary?” [2016] 4 Eur HRL Rev 361 at 366. 
7   Clayton, supra note 1 at 4. 
8   See ibid at 10. 
9   Thomas Fairclough also questions the approach adopted by these authors—which he 
describes as “empirical”—and proposes a “normative” approach based on the principles 
underlying common law rights: see supra note 4.  
10   For a similar understanding of methodology, see Sir Philip Sales, “The Common Law: 
Context and Method” (2019) 135:1 Law Q Rev 47 [Sales, “Context and Method”]; Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, “Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity 
and the Homogenization of the European Union” (2001) 7:1 Colum J Eur L 63 at 77–79. 
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 With a turn toward methods, this article therefore seeks to develop on 
commentary that goes beyond the content and reach of common law rights 
and principles. Much of that commentary can be found in common law ju-
risdictions such as Australia and Canada, though there are also significant 
recent examples in the UK. There is a wealth of Canadian debate on the 
legitimacy and foundation of the use of unwritten constitutional principles 
in interpreting the Constitution.11 In the Australian context, there is exten-
sive literature on the principle of legality, examining the contours of the 
technique, the scope of its application, and its effect on constitutional de-
velopment in that jurisdiction.12 In the UK, despite a focus on the substance 
and reach of common law rights, there is insightful commentary on the 
principle of legality, examining its role in the relationship between parlia-
mentary supremacy and the rule of law, as well as the extent to which it 
bridges the gap between common law and documentary rights.13 This arti-
cle seeks to join and expand on this discourse by considering the role of 
common law methods in constitutional adjudication across several common 
law jurisdictions. This analysis endeavours to contribute to the current dis-
course in two ways. First, the article considers the role and utility of meth-
ods as an analytical category, rather than studying the use of any one par-
ticular method. Second, the article aims to examine the place of methodo-
logical practices in common law constitutional adjudication across a range 
of common law jurisdictions.  
 The analysis draws lessons from countries that can be classified as core 
common law countries—that is, jurisdictions in which judges occupy a cen-
tral role in developing legal norms and which, despite an increase in stat-
utes, do not possess comprehensive legal codes.14 One of the defining char-
 
11   See e.g. Mark D Walters, “The Common Law Constitution in Canada: Return of Lex Non 
Scripta as Fundamental Law” (2001) 51:2 UTLJ 92; Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathom-
able Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27:2 Queen’s LJ 389; Vincent Kazmier-
ski, “Draconian but Not Despotic: The ‘Unwritten’ Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
in Canada” (2010) 41:2 Ottawa L Rev 245. 
12   See e.g. Dan Meagher, “The Principle of Legality and Proportionality in Australian Law” 
in Dan Meagher & Matthew Groves, eds, The Principle of Legality in Australia and New 
Zealand (Sydney: Federation Press, 2017) 114 [Meagher, “Proportionality”]; Dan 
Meagher, “The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights” (2011) 35:2 Mel-
bourne UL Rev 449 [Meagher, “Age of Rights”]. 
13   See e.g. Alison L Young, “Fundamental Common Law Rights and Legislation” in Elliott 
& Hughes, supra note 4, 223 at 229–45; The Honourable Sir Philip Sales, “A Comparison 
of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998” (2009) 125:4 
Law Q Rev 528 at 609–15 [Sales, “A Comparison”]. 
14   See AW Brian Simpson, “Common Law” in Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan, eds, New 
Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Of course, this clas-
sification is not meant to suggest that the common law legal system is a closed category 
without influences from, and interactions with, other legal systems. 
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acteristics of such jurisdictions is that case law and the doctrine of prece-
dent are prominent in legal development.15 The jurisdictions cited range 
from the traditional political constitution framework (the United Kingdom) 
to countries that have embraced the supremacy of documentary constitu-
tions (Canada). This range ensures that, while focusing on core common 
law countries, we are able to examine the operation of common law consti-
tutionalism across a range of constitutional contexts. The transnational fo-
cus of the article reveals commonalities that exist across jurisdictions de-
spite differences between applicable constitutional instruments. Evidence 
of common techniques and approaches can serve to establish and reinforce 
the role of particular techniques in constitutional adjudication in similar 
jurisdictions.16 Alongside providing evidence of common practices, analysis 
of a range of jurisdictions can also indicate reasons for divergence in apply-
ing interpretive techniques.17 The transnational approach therefore ena-
bles a more accurate and complex understanding of the interaction of the 
common law constitution with written constitutional rules, an exercise 
which is necessitated by the global advance of documentary constitutional-
ism and textual human rights guarantees.18 Ultimately, the transnational 
perspective offers a wider view of the impact of common law techniques in 
advancing common law constitutionalism and in injecting elements of legal 
constitutionalism into traditionally political constitutions while retaining 
elements of unwritten constitutionalism in jurisdictions with textual con-
stitutions. The following section explores the concept and elements of com-
mon law constitutionalism, and provides evidence of its operation in core 
common law countries. 
II.  Common Law Constitutionalism  
 Common law is used to denote law that is developed from judicial deci-
sions, “generated by authoritative precedents.”19 The common law is there-
fore understood as a system of law characterized and sustained by judge-
made law. Norms existing at common law derive their authority not from 
 
15   See Curran, supra note 10 at 75–77. 
16   See Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in American 
Courts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) at 48–49. 
17   See Esin Örücü, “Developing Comparative Law” in Esin Örücü & David Nelken, eds, 
Comparative Law: A Handbook (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 43 at 53–55. 
18   See David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitution-
alism” (2011) 99:5 Cal L Rev 1163 at 1167–87, 1194–202. 
19   Peter Jaffey, “Two Ways to Understand the Common Law” (2017) 8:3 Jurisprudence 435 
at 448. 
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appearing in written form but from a combination of reason and practice.20 
Reason, indeed, is said to underpin unwritten law. In Mark Walters’s view, 
unwritten law is 
a discourse of reason in which existing rules, even those articulated 
in writing, are understood to be specific manifestations of a compre-
hensive body of abstract principles from which other rules may be 
identified through an interpretive back‐and‐forth that endeavours to 
show coherence between law's specific and abstract dimensions and ... 
between law’s various applications.21 
Common law norms are accordingly definitionally distinct from statutory 
norms, though the division between the two is tempered by the reality that 
(statutory) language tends to be accompanied by vagueness, which permits 
courts to shape the meaning of statutes.22 The diffusion of the common law 
through English colonization also leads to an understanding of the common 
law as a legal family, a legal tradition, or as part of a common law family 
tree.23 While mixing and overlapping with Indigenous as well as other in-
troduced legal systems, core features of the common law have become em-
bedded in diverse locations across the world. This has, in part, facilitated 
the capacity of the common law to grow as a transnational model.24 
 The belief that common law generates fundamental norms that act 
upon the institutions of state and the relationship between the people and 
the state underlies the idea of common law constitutionalism. The common 
law performs some of the core functions of constitutionalism by generating 
and applying norms that assign, organize, and restrain state powers. Com-
mon law principles such as separation of powers assist in the assignation 
and distribution of powers among the institutions of state. The early years 
 
20   See TRS Allan, “Text, Context, and Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason” 
in Douglas E Edlin, ed, Common Law Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 185 [Allan, “Text, Context, and Constitution”]; AWB Simpson, “The Com-
mon Law and Legal Theory” in AWB Simpson, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Sec-
ond Series) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 77 at 92–94. 
21   Mark D Walters, “The Unwritten Constitution as a Legal Concept” in David Dyzenhaus 
& Malcolm Thorburn, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016) 33 at 35 [Walters, “The Unwritten Constitution”]. 
22   See the more critical discussion in JD Heydon, “AWB Simpson's ‘The Common Law and 
Legal Theory’” (2016) 35:1 UQLJ 21 at 27. 
23   See Esin Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-
First Century (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004); Jaako Husa, “The Future of Legal Fam-
ilies” in Oxford Handbooks Online: Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, May 2016), 
online: <www.oxfordhandbooks.com> [perma.cc/5ST9-9S2F]. 
24   “Transnational” is used to denote “non-state relations across frontiers,” as defined by 
William Twining in “Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications” (1996) 
49 Current Leg Probs 1 at 5. 
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of new constitutions in countries like Australia25 and Jamaica26 have been 
aided by appeals to the separation of powers. The concept of separated pow-
ers helped to concretize constitutional understandings of the allocation of 
responsibilities to the branches of government, and in particular to outline 
the exclusive province of judicial power. The common law also supplies fun-
damental constraints on governmental activity through the rule of law, 
which gives rise to a range of requirements and values that are activated 
in common law judging and in the interpretation of constitutional instru-
ments.27 The rule of law famously played a central role in the Quebec Se-
cession Reference, with the Canadian Supreme Court highlighting that 
“[t]he rule of law principle requires that all government action must comply 
with the law, including the Constitution.”28 Compliance with the rule of law 
and constitutionalism meant that amendment of an entrenched constitu-
tion by secession could not be achieved by a simple majority vote.  
 Common law rights and principles fill gaps in constitutions and consti-
tutional legislation and thereby restrain governmental (and, in some coun-
tries, legislative) acts that interfere with fundamental individual inter-
ests.29 A right of access to justice was developed in Canada from the core 
function of superior courts, intertwined with rule of law considerations.30 
The Supreme Court accordingly held that a hearing fee scheme in the prov-
ince of British Columbia was unconstitutional, as the scheme effectively 
prevented some persons from accessing superior courts. In the United 
Kingdom, common law principle mandated that the government could not 
issue a notice to withdraw from the European Union under the prerogative 
power: 
[I]t is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that, unless pri-
mary legislation permits it, the Royal prerogative does not enable 
ministers to change statute law or common law. As Lord Hoffmann 
observed in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs (No 2), “since the 17th century the prerogative has 
not empowered the Crown to change English common or statute law”. 
This is, of course, just as true in relation to Scottish, Welsh or North-
 
25   See R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia, [1956] HCA 10. 
26   See Hinds v R, [1977] AC 195 at 213, [1976] 1 All ER 353 (PC, Jamaica) [Hinds]. 
27   See generally Se-shauna Wheatle, Principled Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication 
(Portland: Hart, 2017) ch 4 [Wheatle, Principled Reasoning]. 
28   Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 72, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Seces-
sion Reference]. 
29   In the Australian context, see James Spigelman, Statutory Interpretation and Human 
Rights (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2008) ch 1.  
30   See Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (AG), 2014 
SCC 59 at paras 30–40 [Trial Lawyers]. 
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ern Irish law. Exercise of ministers’ prerogative powers must there-
fore be consistent both with the common law as laid down by the 
courts and with statutes as enacted by Parliament.31 
The culmination of the Brexit withdrawal notice litigation in Miller demon-
strated the ability of common law norms to condition the process by which 
decisions are made, even if they do not dictate the substance of the decision. 
Operating in the background was the general principle that the common 
law places restrictions on the removal of individual rights. Further, the at-
tempt of the UK Prime Minister to prorogue Parliament for an unusually 
long period of five weeks in the month preceding the UK’s scheduled with-
drawal from the EU was ruled unlawful by the UK Supreme Court, as it 
was incompatible with the constitutional principles of parliamentary sov-
ereignty and accountability.32 While the dominance of parliamentary sov-
ereignty in the UK means that common law norms do not restrain legisla-
tive choices, they do give special protection to important imperatives by 
affecting the means by which laws can be made or unmade. Such special 
protection can be observed in the doctrine of constitutional statutes, devel-
oped by judges to recognize and accord due impact to the special signifi-
cance of statutes that condition the relationship between the individual 
and the state, alter the scope of fundamental rights, or regulate state insti-
tutions.33 Statutes considered “constitutional” can only be repealed or con-
tradicted by subsequent statutes using express terms. The doctrine thereby 
qualifies the ordinary common law rule that terms in earlier statutes can 
be impliedly repealed by contradictory terms in later statutes.34   
 At the heart of common law constitutionalism lies a paradox which is 
also a central characteristic of a constitution. Philip Selznick has helpfully 
described the “paradox of the common law tradition”: it is centred on a vi-
sion of law “as given—if not by divine authority, then by history and prac-
tice—and yet as adaptable to changing needs and circumstances.”35 In sim-
ilar terms, Philip Sales argues that in the common law, “the courts strive 
to achieve a coherent fit with previous case law dealing with the same or 
similar topics whilst at the same time trying to adjust the law to changing 
 
31   R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, [2017] UKSC 5 at para 50 
[references omitted]. 
32   See R (Miller) v Prime Minister; Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland, [2019] UKSC 41 
at paras 40–52 [Miller & Cherry].  
33   See generally Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) [Tho-
burn]; Farrah Ahmed & Adam Perry, “Constitutional Statutes” (2017) 37:2 Oxford J Leg 
Stud 461. 
34   On the doctrine of implied repeal, see Ellen Street Estates, Limited v Minister of Health, 
[1934] 1 KB 590, [1934] All ER Rep 385 (CA). 
35   Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Commu-
nity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) at 449 [emphasis in original]. 
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social needs or expectations.”36 This requires navigation between certainty 
and fluidity, tradition and change. This vision runs parallel with Joseph 
Raz’s view that a constitution must face both backwards and forwards, 
maintaining continuity while facilitating and recognizing change.37 In this 
sense the “split personality”38 of the common law is mirrored in the dual 
objectives of constitutional law: maintaining tradition while permitting de-
velopment. The challenge that characterizes both systems is to delicately 
navigate between the past, present, and future. Both the common law and 
constitutional law seek to maintain coherence, ensuring that new rules and 
principles fit within the matrix of existing understandings. The common 
law accordingly bears some of the hallmarks of a constitution and has the 
capacity to perform constitutionalist functions. The following sections dis-
cuss the constitutionalist functions of the common law through the lens of 
methodology. Part III addresses the capacity of common law methodology 
to retain continued relevance over time, demonstrating the centrality of 
methods to the sustained influence of common law constitutionalism in an 
era of written constitutionalism. 
III. Endurance  
 The endurance of methodology over time furnishes a partial explana-
tion for the temporal endurance of common law constitutionalism. Methods 
endure in part as a result of the common threads that run between common 
law adjudication and statutory interpretation. The existence of these com-
mon threads means that certain methods continue to be utilized despite 
legislative enactments, amendments, or repeal. The precise scope or impact 
of methods may evolve but core elements remain, as a result of the similar-
ities between statutory and common law adjudication as well as adjudica-
tion under a codified constitution.39 Institutional culture and the influence 
of history also account for the staying power of common law methodology 
within jurisdictions in spite of constitutional changes. The influence of a 
historical course on institutional behaviour, as expressed in path depend-
ence theory, reveals an almost organic process by which methodological 
practices become embedded within an institution and influence future in-
 
36   Sales, “Context and Method”, supra note 10 at 47. 
37   See Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Prac-
tical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 343–51.  
38   Sales, “Context and Method”, supra note 10 at 55. 
39   On the continuing impact of stare decisis in adjudication under a codified constitution, 
see Jula Hughes, Vanessa MacDonnell & Karen Pearlston, “Equality & Incrementalism: 
The Role of Common Law Reasoning in Constitutional Rights Cases” (2012–13) 44:3 Ot-
tawa L Rev 467 at 472–74. 
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stitutional choices and approaches. The endurance fostered by the connec-
tions between common law and statutory judging as well as the influence 
of path dependence are explored in this part of the article.  
A. Commonality Between Common Law and Statutory Methods 
Robert Leckey has persuasively argued that the differences between com-
mon law rights approaches and those emanating from statute law are best 
understood as a matter of degree rather than kind.40 Leckey starts from a 
rejection of what he terms “bill-of-rights exceptionalism,” which he de-
scribes as a point of view that 
adjudication under a bill of rights is a bounded, novel practice that 
emerges after a rights instrument enters into force. In this way, many 
authors regard judges’ interpretation and enforcement of entrenched 
rights as an enterprise autonomous from their work in private law, 
the body of rules regulating relationships between individuals and 
between individuals and property.41 
Rights exceptionalism tends to under-appreciate enhancements of judicial 
power that predate the introduction of a bill of rights, to conceal or ignore 
the continuity between the pre- and post-bill of rights judicial role, and to 
prioritize the power to invalidate legislation to the detriment of other exer-
cises of judicial power. In opposition to this viewpoint, Leckey draws atten-
tion to questions of procedure and technique in preference to a focus on 
substantive issues. His approach advocates “situat[ing] rights adjudication 
in the long-term trajectory of the common law and the tradition of judging 
within the Commonwealth.”42 
 This line of argument is similar to commentary that scholars such as 
Aileen Kavanagh have made in the context of interpretation under the 
HRA.43 The introduction of the HRA sought to “bring rights home” to the 
UK by incorporating rights set out in the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Act struck a balance between rights guarantees and parlia-
mentary sovereignty by allowing courts to interpret legislation consistently 
with rights or issue declarations that a statute contravenes Convention 
rights without affecting the validity of legislation. The terms of the debate 
surrounding the interpretation of the HRA have largely implicitly accepted 
continuity between common law modes of reasoning and HRA interpreta-
tion. Subsection 3(1) of the HRA contains the following interpretive man-
date: “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
 
40   See Robert Leckey, Bills of Rights in the Common Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
41   Ibid at 9. 
42   Ibid at 18. 
43   See Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review Under the UK Human Rights Act (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Kavanagh, Constitutional Review]. 
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legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with 
the Convention rights.” The boundaries of the interpretive power (and 
duty) encapsulated in this subsection are often discussed in relation to the 
baseline of pre-HRA interpretive powers and often using the language of 
pre-HRA powers. Kavanagh, for example, casts the interpretive power un-
der subsection 3(1) of the HRA as a “strong presumption of statutory inter-
pretation” and convincingly argues that “presumptions of statutory inter-
pretation are a familiar and long-standing judicial tool by which judges 
have protected fundamental rights in the common law.”44 Such presump-
tions—including the presumption that powers conferred by statute should 
be exercised in accordance with fundamental rights—have been collec-
tively referred to as part of “the common law of the constitution” and as a 
long-standing method of judicial constitutional review.45 Understood 
against this common law history, subsection 3(1) can be viewed as a more 
intense or stronger form of presumption; under subsection 3(1), courts may 
be more assertive in adopting an interpretation that achieves rights con-
sistency. The provision has therefore been construed as conferring power 
to adopt strained interpretations and even change the meaning of a stat-
ute.46 
 Further, techniques of “reading in” and “reading down” are used under 
subsection 3(1) to alter the meaning of legislation. While these techniques 
are strong remedial powers of statutory alteration, they are far from novel 
practices; they have been a mainstay of British judicial interpretation pre-
dating the HRA. It has long been recognized that “words can be read into 
a statute” to save it from “absurdity, inconsistency or illogicality.”47 Cross’s 
Statutory Interpretation advised prior to the HRA that courts possessed a 
“limited power to add to, alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent 
a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally unreasonable, un-
workable, or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”48 These 
 
44   Ibid at 91, 95, 97. 
45   Timothy Endicott, “Constitutional Logic” (2003) 53:2 UTLJ 201 at 203. See also Ka-
vanagh, Constitutional Review, supra note 43 at 98. 
46   See generally Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30 [Ghaidan]. 
47   John Snell, “Trouble on Oiled Waters: Statutory Interpretation” (1976) 39:4 Mod L 
Rev 402 at 403. See also Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Department of Trade and 
Industry, [1974] 1 WLR 505 at 524, [1974] 2 All ER 97; Neil Duxbury, “Reading Down” 
(2017) 20:2 Green Bag (2d) 155 at 156. 
48   Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed by John Bell & Sir George Engle (Lon-
don, UK: Butterworths, 1995) at 49, cited in Kavanagh, Constitutional Review, supra 
note 43 at 102. 
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techniques also feature heavily in constitutional interpretation and reme-
dies under constitutional bills of rights in other common law jurisdictions,49 
including Canada50 and the Commonwealth Caribbean.51 
B. Path Dependence 
 The influence of history on the present and future of common law de-
velopment can be partly understood in terms of path dependence theory. 
Path dependence speaks to 
a causal relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, with 
each stage strongly influencing the direction of the following stage. 
At the most basic level, therefore, path dependence implies that 
“what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”52 
This theory has relevance to common law systems on account of decision 
rules that are operative under common law adjudication. Among such rules 
are stare decisis—that prior decisions of a higher court are binding on lower 
courts in cases with similar facts—and the rule that courts will tend to fol-
low their own decisions even if those decisions are not binding.53 These de-
cision rules serve to create and maintain coherence and consistency within 
the legal system.  
 Courts follow precedent for a variety of reasons, including factors such 
as judges’ desire to preserve their own reputation and prestige, awareness 
that their decisions may be overruled if they fail to follow binding prece-
dent, and that if they dismiss precedent, they thereby undermine part of 
the foundation for the acceptance of their own decisions. Reasons of con-
sistency and coherence also play an important role. The internal coherence 
of norms within the system—whereby rules and principles exist in accord—
is facilitated by respect for past decisions.54 The desirability of temporal 
consistency within the common law is a further driver of judicial regard for 
precedent; the system and its agents would be undermined if citizens were 
 
49   See e.g. Roger Masterman & Se-shauna Wheatle, “Unity, Disunity and Vacuity: Consti-
tutional Adjudication and the Common Law” in Mark Elliott, Jason NE Varuhas & 
Shona Wilson Stark, eds, The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Compar-
ative Perspectives (Oxford: Hart, 2018) 123 at 129 [Masterman & Wheatle, “Unity, Dis-
unity and Vacuity”]; Leckey, supra note 40 at 40–51. 
50   See Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679 at 698–703, 93 DLR (4th) 1. 
51   See e.g. AG v Joseph, [2006] CCJ 1 (AJ) at para 25 (Wit J). 
52   Oona A Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System” (2001) 86:2 Iowa L Rev 601 at 604. 
53   See ibid at 622–23. 
54   See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986) at 239; Neil 
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
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without the guidance that the past offers to the likely decisions and ap-
proaches the courts would take. Commitment to a level of temporal con-
sistency is also manifest as a core characteristic of the rule of law, which 
encourages certainty to enable decision-making informed by awareness of 
likely legal consequences.55 A belief in basic fairness and rationality, which 
both demand that like cases should be treated alike, also tends in favour of 
upholding precedent and encourages faith in the legal system. Oona Hath-
away is perhaps correct though in opining that “[p]erhaps most important, 
judges conform to the doctrine of stare decisis because the principle of prec-
edent is deeply ingrained in our ... legal culture.”56  
 One might challenge the continuing relevance of path dependence the-
ory when legislated constitutional norms have been introduced. The argu-
ment could be made that the intrusion of statutes—particularly en-
trenched, supreme statutes—produces a material change and shifts the 
conversation from one about common law norms to one of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. However, common law constitutionalism 
continues to be activated in two respects. First, interpretation remains 
within the province of the judges, who will be constrained to some extent 
by the past—by rules of statutory interpretation developed by the judiciary 
and by norms that inform the relative scope of judicial, legislative, and ex-
ecutive power. Second, the past will supply a constraint in an institutional 
sense. The institutional culture that has evolved within the judiciary will 
influence interpretive choices made under statutory norms. The former 
constraint is therefore based on the separation of powers while the latter 
is more cultural and amorphous. Neither of these two constraints prevents 
change, even radical change, from occurring. Nonetheless, they do exert 
some influence on the pace and contours of that change. For instance, the 
tepid approach of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in early in-
terpretations of Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions can be under-
stood in the context of path dependence. The constitutions were described 
as “evolutionary” and were characterized as instruments that provided con-
tinuity with the rights and constitutional principles of the past.57 More spe-
cifically, the rights guaranteed in the new constitutions were ruled to be 
mere restatements of rights pre-existing under common law, which thereby 
limited the development or discovery of new rights based on current inter-
pretations of the constitution.58 As late as 1996, this reasoning was used to 
 
55   See Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2005) ch 2; Hathaway, supra note 52 at 651–52. 
56   Supra note 52 at 627. Hathaway there spoke to the “Anglo-American legal culture,” but 
the reflexive preference for upholding precedent is almost certainly a feature of judging 
in the United Kingdom and other common law countries as well. 
57   See Hinds, supra note 26 at 212. 
58   See Director of Public Prosecutions v Nasralla, [1967] 2 AC 238 at 247–48, [1967] 2 All 
ER 161 (PC, Jamaica). 
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deny the existence of a right to trial within a reasonable time in Trinidad 
and Tobago.59  
 Judicial attitudes do not remain fixed indefinitely; early attitudes to 
the constitutions of the anglophone Caribbean eventually gave way to more 
assertive and transformative interpretive practices. However, the key 
takeaway is that judicial choices and approaches were influenced by prec-
edents and behaviour predating the constitutions.  
 The influence of path dependence does not exclusively tend toward con-
servative approaches or outcomes. Constitutional changes can influence ju-
dicial activity and attitudes in a more activist or assertive direction. This 
trajectory is observed in the United Kingdom as a result of reforms such as 
the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) and the Human Rights Act 
1998. While UK courts traditionally played a subordinate role to the legis-
lature as a result of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, the courts 
have, due to legislation such as the ECA and HRA, come to exercise powers 
of quasi-constitutional review.60 Masterman and Murkens suggest that 
[j]udicial review is still limited by Parliamentary sovereignty. How-
ever, this limitation has been significantly reduced by membership of 
the European Union, the increased effect of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and the determination of some judges to protect 
fundamental constitutional rights. This trend may continue, should 
the courts claim an inherent power to strike down legislation or, at 
least, to render ineffective any Act of Parliament viewed as “uncon-
stitutional”.61 
Lord Steyn has argued that the ECA, the HRA, and the devolution of re-
gional power under the Scotland Act 1998 established that the UK does not 
have “an uncontrolled constitution,” noting that “[m]oreover, the European 
Convention on Human Rights as incorporated into our law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998, created a new legal order.”62 The new legal order included 
a complexification of the UK’s constitution as seen in the acknowledgement 
of constitutional statutes that are insulated from implied repeal. The con-
stitutional statutes doctrine has been used to explain why, under the ECA, 
ordinary domestic law had to be disapplied in the face of inconsistent EU 
law. Statutes such as the ECA were deemed constitutional statutes, and 
express words were required to contravene or repeal such statutes.63 Even 
 
59   See Director of Public Prosecutions v Tokai, [1996] AC 856 at 862, [1996] 3 WLR 149 (PC, 
Trinidad and Tobago). 
60   See Roger Masterman & Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, “Skirting Supremacy and Subordi-
nation: The Constitutional Authority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court” [2013] 4 
Public L 800 at 809–11. 
61   Ibid at 819–20. 
62   R (Jackson) v AG, [2005] UKHL 56 at para 102 [Jackson]. 
63   See Thoburn, supra note 33 at paras 62–63. 
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more indicative of the complex constitutional framework developing in the 
UK and the role of the courts in constructing and navigating the new con-
stitutional landscape are judicial statements on the interaction between 
constitutional statutes. Lords Neuberger and Mance proffered that in light 
of the “constitutional instruments” and constitutional common law princi-
ples now recognized by the courts 
[i]t is, putting the point at its lowest, certainly arguable (and it is for 
United Kingdom law and courts to determine) that there may be fun-
damental principles, whether contained in other constitutional in-
struments or recognised at common law, of which Parliament when 
it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 did not either con-
template or authorise the abrogation.64 
Moreover, in Lord Reed’s assessment, the task of resolving conflicts be-
tween constitutional norms fell to the courts: “If there is a conflict between 
a constitutional principle ... and EU law, that conflict has to be resolved by 
our courts as an issue arising under the constitutional law of the United 
Kingdom.”65 The constitution accordingly became highly textured, requir-
ing renewed reflection on the constitutional precepts that govern the insti-
tutions of state. Courts were not only empowered under the new statutes 
but also assumed great importance in working out the terms of the new 
constitutional settlement and reconciling new legislation with pre-existing 
constitutional norms.  
 These legislative changes were accompanied by an expansion of the 
grounds of judicial administrative review and the intensity with which 
courts carried out such review. The combination of legislative and common 
law changes has been reflected in a changing judicial culture. Graham Gee 
and Richard Ekins, arguing for a winding back of judicial power in the UK, 
observe that 
EU membership has not only elevated judicial power within the 
sphere of EU law itself. There has been an additional (and, from our 
vantage point, very troubling) “spill over” effect: the legal implica-
tions of EU membership have encouraged some judges to grow scep-
tical about parliamentary sovereignty and to speculate about intro-
ducing proportionality as a general ground of ordinary judicial re-
view.66 
Judicial assertiveness was vividly displayed in Privacy International, in 
which the UK Supreme Court restrictively interpreted an ouster clause in 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Subsection 67(8) of the 
Act—which stated in relevant part that “decisions of the [Investigatory 
 
64   R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3 at 
para 207 [HS2]. 
65   Ibid at para 79.  
66   Richard Ekins & Graham Gee, “Putting Judicial Power in Its Place” (2017) 36:2 
UQLJ 375 at 379–80. 
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Powers Tribunal] (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) 
shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court”—
was interpreted as insufficient to exclude judicial review where the tribu-
nal made an error of law, including an error of law in determining whether 
the tribunal had jurisdiction. The Court’s construction undoubtedly chal-
lenges the apparent intention behind the words “including decisions as to 
whether they have jurisdiction” and the Court has accordingly been ac-
cused of “challenging the legislature’s legally unlimited law-making au-
thority.”67 Yet, it is on this point that the Court’s assertiveness meets the 
evolving constitutional order, for the view is emergent within the judiciary 
that the issue in such cases is constitutional interpretation and not ordi-
nary statutory interpretation. So understood, the judicial task is not merely 
one of discerning the intention of Parliament; the task in constitutional in-
terpretation within a modern constitutional order is rather to apply and 
secure respect for constitutional rules and principles. Lord Carnwath ac-
cordingly explained in Privacy International that where ouster clauses are 
at issue, “conventional principles of statutory interpretation, based on the 
ordinary meaning of the words used by Parliament, have yielded to a more 
fundamental principle that no inferior tribunal or authority can conclu-
sively determine the limits of its own jurisdiction.”68 The Supreme Court 
thereby prevented local law developing in localized courts, free from the 
regulation of common law; in this way, the Court furthered order and co-
herence within the legal system. UK courts have accordingly used the com-
mon law to achieve similar results to those of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
which has relied on the terms of its Constitution to limit the effectiveness 
of ouster clauses.69  
 Further revealing the effect of the constitutional authority with which 
British courts have been imbued, Lord Carnwath offered, obiter dictum, in 
Privacy International:  
I see a strong case for holding that, consistently with the rule of law, 
binding effect cannot be given to a clause which purports wholly to 
 
67   Mike Gordon, “Privacy International, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Synthetic Con-
stitution” (26 June 2019), online (blog): UK Constitutional Law Association <ukconstitu-
tionallaw.org> [perma.cc/3KRA-23LL].  
68   R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal, [2019] UKSC 22 at para 34 
[Privacy International]. 
69   As held in Crevier v Quebec (AG), [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 234, 127 DLR (3d) 1, “where a 
provincial Legislature purports to insulate one of its statutory tribunals from any curial 
review of its adjudicative functions, the insulation encompassing jurisdiction, such pro-
vincial legislation must be struck down as unconstitutional by reason of having the effect 
of constituting the tribunal a s. 96 court.” Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 speaks 
to the power to appoint superior, district, and county judges in the provinces. See also 
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 at paras 51–55, 130 DLR (4th) 385. 
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exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to review a de-
cision of an inferior court or tribunal.70  
This controversial view was supported in part by reference to statutory 
recognition of the rule of law in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the 
courts’ recognition of the constitutional status of such legislation through 
the doctrine of constitutional statutes.71 The Court’s treatment of ouster 
clauses has, in Lord Carnwath’s view, come to reflect both respect for in-
ferred legislative intention and “the fundamental principles of the rule of 
law”;72 and the courts were the ultimate arbiters of the rule of law’s require-
ments. This understanding of the relationship between the courts and Par-
liament was described as “wholly consistent with the modern constitu-
tional settlement.”73 The evolution of the British constitutional settlement 
during the late twentieth century therefore contributed to the evolution of 
judicial behaviour and judicial perception of institutional roles and respon-
sibilities.   
 Judicial behaviour is manifested in techniques and interpretive ap-
proaches, as in Privacy International and Evans. Techniques and ap-
proaches can become embedded within an institution and outlive statutory 
changes. The potential persistence of strong judicial interpretive tech-
niques is now mooted in the UK against the background of the governing 
Conservative Party’s proposal to repeal the HRA.74 Renewed common law 
constitutionalist jurisprudence in British courts, which has seen courts re-
claim the importance of the common law in settling human rights issues, 
should be understood within the context of preparations for a post-HRA 
country. Ekins and Gee therefore posit that the revival of common law 
rights constitutional discourse “may be an attempt to anticipate the HRA’s 
possible repeal and to render it less significant than would otherwise be the 
case.”75 Any such attempts must rest on “a new disposition that eschews 
the traditional limits on judicial technique and authority.”76 In other words, 
the survival of human rights protections in the UK after a possible repeal 
of the HRA rests in large part on the retention—and expansion—of judicial 
techniques and approaches; in short, it rests as least as much on methods 
as it does on substantive norms. 
 
70   Privacy International, supra note 68 at para 144. 
71   See ibid at para 120; Thoburn, supra note 33 at paras 62–63; HS2, supra note 64 at 
para 207. 
72   Privacy International, supra note 68 at para 130. 
73   Ibid at para 131. 
74   See Conservative Party, “The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015” (2015) at 73, online 
(pdf): Lancaster University <ucrel.lancs.ac.uk> [perma.cc/3NHQ-XT8Z].  
75   Supra note 66 at 381.  
76   Ibid at 382. 
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IV.  Portability 
 Judicial techniques are such an integral facet of the common law tradi-
tion that an analysis of methodology is central to an account of the devel-
opment of the common law as a transnational constitutional enterprise.77 
This section reflects on the operation of common law constitutionalist rea-
soning across jurisdictional borders and the role of judicial techniques in 
facilitating this transnational activity. First, I examine the concept of the 
unity of the common law, discussing the drive for unity in the common law 
world during colonialism and the extent to which the lingering desire for 
harmony persists among common law courts today. Secondly, I turn toward 
specific methodological practices that foster the transnational movement 
of common law constitutionalism by examining the principle of legality and 
judicial implications of constitutional principles. 
A. Common Law Unity 
 Part of the driving force for the common law’s transnational capacity is 
the inclination toward unity in the common law. Esin Örücü refers to “a 
consciousness that common law is a whole and that this unity is a very real 
tie between the jurisdictions within the legal tradition.”78 In past centuries, 
English colonial administration was typified by an effort to impose the Eng-
lish legal system throughout the colonies, and the common law was seen as 
a means of establishing “order” within and across colonial territories. While 
“conquered” or “ceded” territories retained threads of previous legal tradi-
tions, existing alongside common law norms, colonies that were deemed 
“settled colonies” were made to wholly adopt the common law legal sys-
tem.79 The desire for maintaining commonality across colonial territories 
persisted even after the majority of colonies gained independence. The 
Privy Council played an important centralizing role in preserving a level of 
unity among post-colonial jurisdictions. In hearing an appeal from Belize 
on the issue of the onus of proof in provocation cases, for instance, the Privy 
Council favourably commented that the decision that the onus should lie 
on the prosecution would “bring Belize into line with other Commonwealth 
countries of the Caribbean.”80  
 
77   See Leckey, supra note 40 at 36. 
78   Esin Örücü, Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in 
Transition, vol 59, Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking [Dutch Association 
of Comparative Law] (Deventer: Kluwer, 1999) at 37. 
79   Ibid at 35. Settled territories were those without a previous European ruler, while ceded 
territories referred to lands that were conquered or ceded by a previous European colo-
nizer. These categories were therefore decidedly Eurocentric—Indigenous legal tradi-
tions and systems were ignored so that in the absence of an imperial power, the land was 
considered terra nullius. See Mabo v Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23 at paras 31–46. 
80   Vasquez v R, [1994] 1 WLR 1304 at 1314, [1994] 3 All ER 674 (PC, Belize). 
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 There has, over time, been recognition that complete harmony among 
common law countries is unrealistic, as countries become more experienced 
and confident in the interpretation of their own constitutions in line with 
local circumstances that prevail in their jurisdictions. Accordingly, the 
Privy Council in Invercargill City Council v. Hamlin acknowledged the wis-
dom of the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s departure from English law in 
the field of negligence.81 The Privy Council even painted diversity within 
the common law as a strength: 
The ability of the common law to adapt itself to the differing circum-
stances of the countries in which it has taken root, is not a weakness, 
but one of its great strengths. Were it not so, the common law would 
not have flourished as it has, with all the common law countries 
learning from each other.82  
In spite of this recognition of the need for, and desirability of, divergence 
among common law countries in some legal fields, there remain judicial 
expressions of support for common law unity. Lord Reed has recently ar-
gued that “in a globalised world, there are practical advantages in the com-
mon law jurisdictions achieving a degree of coherence and consistency in 
their case law.”83 As recently as 2014, the UK Supreme Court expressed a 
desire for harmonization: 
As overseas countries secede from the jurisdiction of the Privy Coun-
cil, it is inevitable that inconsistencies in the common law will de-
velop between different jurisdictions. However, it seems to us highly 
desirable for all those jurisdictions to learn from each other, and at 
least to lean in favour of harmonising the development of the common 
law round the world.84 
The Court thereby expressed a preference for harmonization but more im-
portantly emphasized the importance of common law countries learning 
from each other. This tempered, modern expression of common law unity 
is more relevant today. This vision correctly recognizes the value in the 
common law’s adaptability to divergent and changing circumstances.85  
 There is strong evidence of continuity in interpretive techniques and 
methods across jurisdictions with codified constitutions and those with 
 
81   [1996] AC 624 at 624, [1996] 1 All ER 756 (PC, NZ). 
82   Ibid at 640. 
83   Robert Reed, “Comparative Public Law in the UK Supreme Court” in Elliott, Varuhas & 
Stark, supra note 49, 243 at 248. 
84   FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC, [2014] UKSC 45 at para 45. 
85   The impact of secession from Privy Council jurisdiction has resulted in a tempered ap-
proach that can be described as “respect and evolution.” The treatment of Privy Council 
decisions by the Caribbean Court of Justice, for instance, has included a balance of ac-
ceptance of a generally generous interpretive approach to human rights and a more skep-
tical approach to pre-colonial laws. See e.g. Nervais v R, [2018] CCJ 19 (AJ) [Nervais]; 
McEwan v AG of Guyana, [2018] CCJ 30 (AJ) at paras 29–34, 41–45 [McEwan]. 
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largely uncodified constitutions.86 The potential for common law constitu-
tionalism to exert influence through and alongside a written constitution 
was observable as early as the adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States. James Stoner has explained that the US Constitution’s innova-
tions, including the separation of powers and a bill of rights, were part of a 
reform of the legal order rather than a replacement.87 Even “in adding the 
Bill of Rights, they gave written constitutional status to numerous common 
law privileges and immunities, summed up in the phrase ‘due process of 
law.’”88 Moreover, the US Constitution and subsequent constitutions in 
common law countries were enacted against a background of common law 
traditions and norms. This background helps to shape the textual provi-
sions of a written constitution and contributes to the meaning given to 
those provisions through constitutional interpretation. It is through inter-
pretation that the real meaning of the text comes forth, and in this sense 
the common law animates the words of the constitution.89 
 Common law unity continues to be sustained by comparative engage-
ment between jurisdictions. However, the historical origins of the transna-
tional spread of the common law complicate both judicial engagement with, 
and academic analysis of, common law doctrine and methods. In post-colo-
nial jurisdictions there is an inherent challenge in placing reliance on a 
legal tradition that is itself bound up with colonialism.90 In the United 
Kingdom, the (post-)colonial shadow arguably persists in preferences ex-
pressed through the selection of comparator jurisdictions. A rise in consti-
tutionalist legislation in the UK from the late twentieth century—in part 
occasioned by the European Convention on Human Rights, membership of 
the European Union, and devolution of power to the regions of Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Wales—has substantially enlarged the constitu-
tional responsibilities of the judiciary. In discharging its increased consti-
tutional duties, the UK House of Lords and subsequently the UK Supreme 
Court have proved to be receptive to foreign judgments, particularly in its 
human rights decisions.91 The appeal of a common legal family and com-
mon language can be seen in the selection of common law countries, with 
 
86   See Leckey, supra note 40 at 18–19. 
87   See James R Stoner Jr, “Natural Law, Common Law and the Constitution” in Edlin, 
supra note 20, 171 at 177. 
88   Ibid. 
89   See Allan, “Text, Context and Constitution”, supra note 20. 
90   See Alastair Pennycook, English and the Discourses of Colonialism (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1998) at 60–62; Tracy Robinson, “Gender, Nation and the Common Law Con-
stitution” (2008) 28:4 Oxford J Leg Stud 735 at 739–44. 
91   See Hélène Tyrrell, Human Rights in the UK and the Influence of Foreign Jurisprudence 
(Oxford: Hart, 2018); John Bell, “Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010–11” 
(2012) 1:2 Cambridge J Intl & Comparative L 20 at 24. 
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Elaine Mak observing that “sources most often referred to come from Com-
monwealth legal systems and from the US legal system.”92 The very will-
ingness of UK courts to invoke judicial decisions from other common law 
jurisdictions evinces some openness to learning from those countries. This 
suggests an acknowledgement that former colonies may have useful 
knowledge to impart to British institutions. While receptivity to an ex-
change of knowledge from the “New World” to the Old may superficially 
appear to disrupt colonial relationships, further interrogation of compara-
tive exchanges within the common law world suggests that colonial dynam-
ics have not been completely unsettled. In explaining the utility of compar-
ative law in the public law field, Lord Reed referred predominantly to Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, observing 
that 
the court in the common law world whose judgments are most fre-
quently cited to us in public law cases is the Canadian Supreme 
Court: its Charter jurisprudence applies similarly worded guarantees 
to those of the ECHR in the context of a broadly similar system of 
government and law to our own.93 
The italicized phrase suggests that the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is drafted in similar terms to the ECHR. However, there are sig-
nificant differences between the two instruments, particularly in their 
treatment of limitations on rights guarantees. Moreover, multiple rights 
instruments in Africa and the Commonwealth Caribbean were drafted us-
ing the ECHR as a direct or indirect model.94 Indeed, the ECHR served as 
a model for the Nigerian Bill of Rights, which then became the model for 
bills of rights in other newly independent anglophone states.95 While the 
Canadian Charter of 1982 was influenced by international instruments 
that include the European Convention, bills of rights in the Global South 
that were specifically modelled on the ECHR bear at least as many simi-
larities with that instrument as the Canadian Charter. Lord Reed’s articu-
lation of the Supreme Court’s preference for Canadian jurisprudence there-
fore requires further interrogation. The preference for Canada may also lie 
in Lord Reed’s approval of references to “developed countries” and “courts 
in broadly comparable societies, such as Canada and the United States.”96 
The persistent imbalance in jurisdictional citations and influence under-
cuts a narrative that judges are engaged in “dialogue,” as the term dialogue 
 
92   Elaine Mak, “Why Do Dutch and UK Judges Cite Foreign Law?” (2011) 70:2 Cambridge 
LJ 420 at 436. 
93   Reed, supra note 83 at 252 [emphasis added]. 
94   See Charles OH Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domes-
tic Human Rights Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007) at 17–18.  
95   See ibid at 17. 
96   Reed, supra note 83 at 247, 248. 
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implies a mutual flow of information and ideas. Accordingly, a tendency 
toward common law unity and harmonization does endure, but what also 
endures is a tendency toward hegemony in transnational interactions. 
Awareness of this hegemony and continuing reflection on the factors that 
influence it must colour our assessment of the transnational dimension of 
the common law.  
 Enduring inclinations toward common law harmonization are culti-
vated in part by the common threads between written and unwritten con-
stitutionalism, as explored in Part II. The commonalities between these 
two models enable similar methods to exert relevance in jurisdictions 
across the spectrum from unwritten to written constitutionalism. The 
transnational spread of common law constitutionalism despite the advance 
of written constitutionalism is also facilitated by the reality that constitu-
tions and constitutional statutes do not provide an exhaustive guide to the 
methods that may be employed to elucidate their meaning. This provides 
interpretive space to courts to make judgments about the techniques that 
may be used to give concrete expression to the constitutional values em-
bodied in text. Further, methodologies, which are less influenced by specific 
moral conclusions, are capable of adaptation to suit a variety of constitu-
tional contexts and moral preferences. Methodological techniques are ac-
cordingly well suited to facilitate continued harmonization of the common 
law and play a substantial role in enabling the growth of common law con-
stitutionalism across jurisdictional barriers. The following section explores 
the contribution of two techniques to the endurance and transnational di-
mension of common law constitutionalism. 
B.  Principle of Legality and Implication of Constitutional Principles 
 Through judicial recognition that statutes are enacted against a back-
ground of constitutional norms that constrain the meaning and implica-
tions of legislation, courts sustain methodological connections across bor-
ders.97 Prominent among techniques that influence and foster the retention 
of common law constitutionalist practices across jurisdictions are the prin-
ciple of legality and the implication of constitutional principles. The princi-
ple of legality finds its most meaningful operation in jurisdictions with sig-
nificant constitutional lacunae—countries with an uncodified constitution 
(e.g., the UK and New Zealand) and countries without a constitutional bill 
of rights (e.g., Australia). The interpretive principle serves to bring such 
countries closer to jurisdictions with more comprehensive codified consti-
tutions (such as Canada). Simultaneously, the implication of unwritten 
constitutional principles into codified constitutions keeps the latter group 
of countries connected to common law constitutionalism. As an archetypal 
 
97   See TRS Allan, “In Defence of the Common Law Constitution: Unwritten Rights as Fun-
damental Law” (2009) 22:1 Can JL & Jur 187 at 198 [Allan, “In Defence”]. 
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common law technique, reasoning by principle inherently connects consti-
tutionalism to the common law system. This intrinsic connection is fur-
thered by judicial references to legal history or modern comparative 
sources to develop the contours of the interpretive technique or the content 
of norms applied through the technique. Through the continuing and trans-
national operation of interpretive methodologies such as the principle of 
legality and implying constitutional principles, common law norms con-
tinue to exert influence in constitutional development in the common law 
world.  
1. Principle of Legality 
 Legislation is subjected to the constraints of common law through the 
principle of legality, which encapsulates a presumption that legislation is 
not meant to violate fundamental rights or fundamental constitutional 
principles.98 Express and clear words are required to override the presump-
tion of consistency and authorize interference with constitutional funda-
mentals.99 While the principle of legality is most often deployed in defence 
of fundamental rights, and while it has been said that “the catalyst for the 
contemporary renaissance for the principle of legality can be traced to ‘[t]he 
rise and rise of human rights,’”100 the presumption has a broader remit. It 
also seeks to protect fundamental constitutional principles. The plurality 
judgment of the UK Supreme Court in R (Evans) v. AG101 has been useful 
in this regard, as it mobilized the principle of legality to interpret a statute 
against the requirements of the rule of law. Evans was the result of litiga-
tion initiated by a journalist, Rob Evans, in an attempt to view correspond-
ence between Prince Charles and ministers of government. Evans re-
quested access to the communications under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (FOIA), but his request was denied. In response to a challenge to 
this refusal, the Upper Tribunal ordered disclosure. However, the Attorney 
General then issued a certificate under subsection 53(2) of the FOIA stat-
ing that he had “on reasonable grounds” concluded that the government 
departments were entitled to refuse disclosure. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, it was held that because the Upper Tribunal is “a judicial body ... 
 
98   See R v Home Secretary, ex parte Pierson, [1997] UKHL 37, [1998] AC 539 at 587–89 
[Pierson]; R v Home Secretary, ex parte Simms, [1999] UKHL 33, [2000] 2 AC 115 at 132 
[Simms]. A wider understanding of the principle of legality mandates that the state must 
exercise its powers subject to and in accordance with pre-established law. See also David 
Dyzenhaus, “The Puzzle of Martial Law” (2009) 59:1 UTLJ 1 at 13; Stuart Lakin, “De-
bunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in 
the British Constitution” (2008) 28:4 Oxford J Leg Stud 709 at 730–32. 
99   See Coco v R, [1994] HCA 15 at para 9; Pierson, supra note 98 at 575; Simms, supra 
note 98 at 131. 
100  Meagher, “Age of Rights”, supra note 12 at 453. 
101  [2015] UKSC 21 [Evans]. 
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which has the same status as the High Court,”102 the Attorney General’s 
certificate could not be upheld, as that would permit executive override of 
a judicial decision. Such an override was described as a breach of the rule 
of law requirements that a decision of a court is binding and cannot be set 
aside by anyone, including the executive, and that executive decisions are 
reviewable by a court.103 Lord Neuberger surveyed judicial exposition of the 
principle of legality, demonstrating that it encompasses both “fundamental 
rights” and “basic principles.”104 He was therefore able to find that the 
FOIA—interpreted in line with the rule of law as applied through the prin-
ciple of legality—does not authorize the Attorney General to override an 
Upper Tribunal decision. 
 The principle of legality’s relevance in comparative constitutionalism is 
reflected in Lord Hoffmann’s assertion in Simms of the similarities be-
tween constitutional interpretation in the UK and constitutionalism as 
practised in common law countries with codified constitutions: 
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implica-
tions of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary 
implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even 
the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights 
of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, 
though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply princi-
ples of constitutionality little different from those which exist in coun-
tries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a con-
stitutional document.105 
This passage represents a demonstrable “constitutionalization” of the in-
terpretive principle.106 Lord Hoffmann’s description of the principle of le-
gality has come to be viewed in other common law jurisdictions as the “de-
finitive modern restatement of the principle”107 and his comparison has 
been cited approvingly by Australian federal courts in Plaintiff S157108 and 
Evans v. New South Wales.109 Even in countries with codified constitutions, 
the principle of legality retains force where there is a lacuna in the consti-
tution. Thus, the presumption is activated when courts are required to de-
termine whether legislation should be held to override common law 
 
102  Ibid at para 2. 
103  See ibid at paras 53–59.  
104  Ibid at paras 56–57. 
105  Simms, supra note 98 at 131. 
106  Young, “Fundamental Common Law Rights and Legislation”, supra note 13 at 226–29.  
107  Matthew Groves, “The Principle of Legality and Administrative Discretion: A New Name 
for an Old Approach?” in Meagher & Groves, supra note 12, 168 at 168.  
108  Plaintiff S157/2002 v Australia, [2003] HCA 2 at para 30 [Plaintiff S157]. 
109  [2008] FCAFC 130 at para 72.  
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rights.110 The absence of a bill of rights from the Australian federal consti-
tution has triggered judicial attempts to subject legislation to rights con-
straints through the principle of legality.111 The principle is said to protect 
a common law bill of rights including the right to property, personal liberty, 
natural justice, and access to courts.112 Interpretation therefore thrives as 
a rights protective process under the principle of legality, underscoring that 
invalidation through a written bill of rights is only one route to judicial 
rights protection. 
 The Simms passage undoubtedly underestimated both the impact of 
constitutions that confer strong powers of judicial review and the limits of 
common law interpretation within the constraints of parliamentary sover-
eignty. Nonetheless, Lord Hoffmann did highlight core underlying similar-
ities in the objectives and mechanisms of large C and small c constitution-
alist adjudication.113 Both the common law principle of legality and judicial 
enforcement mechanisms under codified constitutions rest on the under-
standing that legislation must be interpreted against a background of rel-
evant constitutional rights and principles. Where constitutional norms are 
engaged, the character of interpretation is impacted, with the effect that 
priority is accorded to the constitutional precept. This dynamic is seen in 
the operation of the principle of legality in cases such as Privacy Interna-
tional, in which Lord Carnwath rejected the government’s submission that 
interpretation of a purported ouster clause should be approached “by refer-
ence not simply to a general presumption against ouster clauses of any 
kind, but rather to careful examination of the language of the provision.”114 
Lord Carnwath (joined by Lady Hale and Lord Kerr) explained:  
The main flaw in this argument, in my view, is that it treats the ex-
ercise as one of ordinary statutory interpretation, designed simply to 
discern “the policy intention” of Parliament, so downgrading the crit-
ical importance of the common law presumption against ouster.115  
 As Sir Philip Sales has explained, “the effect of the application of the 
principle is to change what appears to be the natural meaning of a legisla-
tive provision.”116 The interpretive exercise then moves along the spectrum 
from ordinary to constitutional interpretation and the objective is no longer 
 
110  See Meagher, “Age of Rights”, supra note 12 at 451. 
111  See ibid. 
112  See ibid at 461. See also Dan Meagher, “The Principle of Legality and a Common Law 
Bill of Rights: Clear Statement Rules Head Down Under” (2016) 42:1 Brook J Intl L 65 
at 68. See e.g. Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2010] HCA 23. 
113  See Allan, “In Defence”, supra note 97 at 198. 
114  Supra note 68 at para 106.  
115  Ibid at para 107. 
116  Sales, “A Comparison”, supra note 13 at 605. 
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simply to discern the intention of Parliament. The court’s task becomes de-
termining whether the words can be interpreted consistently with the con-
stitution and, if so, adopting that interpretation.  
 Both the legality principle and textual interpretive mechanisms em-
body the presumption that legislation is to be interpreted consistently with 
the norms of the constitution unless it is impossible to do so.117 The point of 
divergence emerges where there is no possible interpretation that achieves 
consistency with the constitution; when a remedy requires either that the 
statute lose its validity or be subject to legislative amendment, the common 
law principle is, under accepted understandings of the constitution, ex-
hausted. The next step taken by the courts then depends on the terms of 
the written constitution. Yet, this passing of the baton from the common 
law to textual constitutional provisions does not undermine the transna-
tional relevance of the principle of legality. Rather, the strength of the com-
mon law mechanism is revealed in its ability to work in tandem with writ-
ten constitutional provisions.  
 While the interpretive power flowing from the presumption of constitu-
tional consistency gives the appearance of judicial empowerment at the ex-
pense of legislative will, the constitutional implications of the presumption 
are more subtle. It embodies both respect for legislative decision-making 
and respect for the constitution as fundamental law. Moreover, encapsu-
lated in the presumption is the idea that the legislature itself plays a role 
in maintaining constitutional norms, and as such, does not generally in-
tend to legislate in contravention of those norms. Yet, the legislative intent 
involved in the principle of legality is constructive rather than a discern-
ment of an actual state of mind: 
[A]scertainment of legislative intention does not involve discovery of 
an objective, collective mental state but is asserted as a statement of 
compliance with the applicable principles of construction, both com-
mon law and statutory, which are known to parliamentary drafters 
and the courts.118 
The requirement is therefore that the legislation make it clear that the leg-
islature has directed its mind to interference with the right or principle in 
question and decided that the interference should occur.119 Ultimately, the 
constitutional role of the legislature is respected by requiring judicial ac-
 
117  See Alexis Henry-Comley, “The Principle of Legality: An Australian Common Law Bill 
of Rights?” (2013) 15 U Notre Dame Australia L Rev 83 at 107. 
118  Lee v New South Wales (Crime Commission), [2013] HCA 39 at para 45 [Lee]. See also 
Brendan Lim, “The Normativity of the Principle of Legality” (2013) 37:2 Melbourne UL 
Rev 372 at 389–94 on the “normative justification” for the principle of legality, which 
avoids the need for reliance on actual legislative intentions. 
119  See Lee, supra note 118 at para 314. 
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ceptance of clear legislative expressions. Accordingly, “[t]he principle pro-
vides no licence for a court to adjust the meaning of a legislative restriction 
on liberty which the court might think unwise or ill-considered.”120 By re-
sponding to the sometimes competing imperatives of constitutionalism and 
legislative will, the principle of legality thereby bridges the gap between 
parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law.121 This mediation between 
constitutional forces that are seen to represent, respectively, political 
power and legal power is particularly useful in the very countries—includ-
ing the UK and Australia—in which parliamentary supremacy continues 
to hold significant sway despite the rising tide of constitutionalism and hu-
man rights. 
 Despite its valuable contribution to constitutional interpretation in 
multiple common law jurisdictions, the principle of legality faces serious 
contention over its core features. First, while the principle seeks to vindi-
cate fundamental constitutional norms, it lacks a definitive list of prevail-
ing rights and principles. Second, once applicable norms are identified, 
there remains vagueness about their content. Vagueness is, however, not 
unique to common law norms, as constitutional concepts carry with them 
an inevitable level of vagueness. Third, it is unclear whether a constitu-
tional norm is entirely displaced by clear words or whether there should be 
a proportionality analysis to determine the permissible extent of interfer-
ence with the norm.122 Finally, while the principle requires clear expression 
of legislative intention to override conflicting fundamental common law 
norms, the degree of clarity demanded of statutory language is itself sub-
ject to debate. Specifically, the clarity required by the principle of legality 
can refer to one of two options—clarity could be understood as the use of 
unambiguous words, or it could be understood as the use of words specifi-
cally expressing an intention to override a specified right or principle.123 
Evans exhibits the constitutional significance of the debate over the clarity 
of statutory language in applying the principle of legality.124 In the view of 
critical commentators, section 53 of the FOIA clearly authorized the Attor-
ney General to override decisions of the Information Commissioner or the 
Tribunal, so the effect of the plurality’s restrictive interpretation was to 
 
120  North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory, [2015] 
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370      (2019) 65:2   MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
  
“render the clear language of a statute utterly insignificant.”125 However, 
the interpretive disagreement between Lord Neuberger and critics of Ev-
ans can be explained in part by disagreement over what constitutes “clar-
ity.” For Lord Neuberger, it would appear that legislation had to specifi-
cally state that the Attorney General was empowered to override a Tribu-
nal decision. On this view, clarity required specificity as to the constitu-
tional interference authorized and not merely a lack of ambiguous words. 
Since the statute did not contain specific permission to override a judicial 
decision, the clarity threshold was not met.  
 Despite lingering areas of opacity surrounding the principle of legality, 
the interpretive principle remains valuable; it mediates between norms of 
political and legal constitutionalism within jurisdictions while facilitating 
the reach of common law constitutionalist reasoning across jurisdictions. 
Indeed, the unresolved features of the interpretive technique allow space 
for judges to apply the principle within the context of their respective juris-
dictions, with sensitivity to differing normative and institutional impera-
tives. That room for judicial adaptation is useful in permitting the rele-
vance and utility of the principle of legality across a range of jurisdictions. 
2. Implication of Constitutional Principles 
 While the principle of legality serves to bring unwritten constitutional-
ism closer to written constitutionalism, the implication of constitutional 
principles injects elements of unwritten constitutionalism into codified con-
stitutions. The Supreme Court of Canada has embraced this practice, hav-
ing recognized an “internal architecture” of the Constitution informed in 
part by foundational constitutional principles, including democracy and 
the rule of law.126 These principles informed the Court’s opinion on the le-
gality of unilateral secession by Quebec and, more recently, the constitu-
tional requirements for reform and abolition of the Senate.127 Though im-
plied constitutional principles are substantive norms that act upon the rea-
soning and resolution of judicial decisions, invocation of such principles re-
sults from the technique of implication. Implication is an active process 
that involves locating and incorporating relevant principles into a consti-
tutional text. The process of implication can occur in at least five ways. 
First, the equivalence method observes terms within a constitutional text 
that are synonymous with the constitutional principle.128 Second, provi-
sions in a constitutional text are sometimes construed as expressions or 
 
125  Michael Gordon, “The UK’s Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, Bewilderment and Beyond...” 
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126  See Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 at paras 25–26 [Senate Reference]. 
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manifestations of a constitutional principle.129 Third, principles can be im-
plied by reference to the structure or architecture of the constitution.130 
Fourth, principles are identified in non-justiciable131 sections of the consti-
tutional document, such as preambles or directive principles.132 Finally, 
courts locate principles in the unwritten English constitution, elements of 
which have become embedded in other common law countries as a conse-
quence of colonial rule.133  
 Reasoning by principle is embedded within the common law method. 
As “relatively general standards,”134 principles are able to explain the ex-
istence of more specific standards. Indeed, for common lawyers, “[r]ules of 
law explicitly recognized in cases were taken to be evidence of a compre-
hensive body of legal principle.”135 The rule of law, for example, can serve 
as a basis for the relatively more specific rule that individuals must have 
access to court to claim their legal interests and rights. The generality of 
principles also helps to explain their ability to speak across jurisdictional 
boundaries and to develop their content in part through comparative judi-
cial engagement. By supplying underpinning explanations for a range of 
constitutional rules, principles help constitutional actors make sense of 
these rules and their interaction. Principles thereby justify the rules of the 
constitution and contribute to coherence within the legal system.136 Princi-
ples that have been employed in this fashion include the rule of law, sepa-
ration of powers, judicial independence, democracy, and equality.137  
 The separation of powers, alongside judicial independence, has been in-
voked in interpreting codified constitutions. Separation of powers is seen 
as a core component of the “Westminster model of written constitutions,” 
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more concretely expressed in the separation and independence of the judi-
ciary from executive and legislative organs.138 While the UK, the seat of 
Westminster, was slow to give full-fledged recognition or normative force 
to the separation of powers, the principle has become more explicitly em-
braced by British judges and has been utilized to grapple with the demands 
of independent and impartial adjudication pursuant to Article 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights as applied domestically through the 
HRA.139 The ascendance of separation of powers reasoning in the UK is re-
flected in Lord Steyn’s observation in R (Anderson) v. Home Secretary that 
“Article 6(1) requires effective separation of powers between the courts and 
the executive, and further requires that what can in shorthand be called 
judicial functions may only be exercised by the courts.”140 Even prior to the 
HRA’s implementation, the House of Lords referred to the “constitutional 
principle of separation of powers” in addressing the Home Secretary’s 
power to fix minimum detention periods for life sentence prisoners.141 More-
over, judicial characterization of separation of powers imperatives high-
lights values that transcend national borders. In this vein, the Caribbean 
Court of Justice has explained that “[a]pplication of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine upholds the Constitution, advances the rule of law and pro-
motes the description of Belize as ‘a sovereign democratic state.’”142 Specif-
ically, in Belize (AG) v. Zuniga, the court explained the relationship between 
the implied separation of powers principle and the written constitution: 
[I]n the post-independence Anglophone Caribbean the doctrine of the 
separation of powers derives its force from the fact that the funda-
mental law upon which the legal order rests, i.e. the Constitution, 
disperses the power of the sovereign State among various 
branches.143 
 More demonstratively, courts in the common law world connect the rule 
of law to foreign or universal imperatives. Accordingly, Lord Neuberger in 
Evans expressed a global view of the rule of law requirement that court 
decisions be respected, by claiming that a “statutory provision which enti-
tles a member of the executive (whether a Government Minister or the At-
torney General) to overrule a decision of the judiciary merely because he 
does not agree with it would not merely be unique in the laws of the United 
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Kingdom.”144 The question was thereby placed within a global context, and 
the court’s interpretation could consequently be construed as consistent 
with a wider constitutionalist tradition. There is a similar pattern discern-
ible in the Privy Council’s description of protection of due process of law in 
the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago as inclusive of respect for rule of 
law, which in turn upholds “universally accepted standards of justice.”145 
By implying into statutory or constitutional text principles that are de-
scribed as common to constitutionalism itself and the very bedrock of jus-
tice accepted throughout the constitutional world, judges subtly indicate 
their engagement in a transnational constitutionalist tradition. At times, 
the common law connections are made explicit, as in the Caribbean Court 
of Justice’s claim that the rule of law “incorporates those fundamental rules 
of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the common law of 
England.”146 Indeed, the interpretive relevance of the idea that the rule of 
law in a basic and universally understood sense requires the presence of 
law, which underpinned the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, was 
also justified by its place in the common law constitution inherited from 
England.147 The court could accordingly conclude that while a large swath 
of the province’s legislation had contravened mandatory language require-
ments, the rule of law required that the court confer temporary validity on 
the laws to avoid a vast legal vacuum.  
 Yet there are issues that complicate the implication of unwritten con-
stitutional principles and are raised as a challenge to the legitimacy of this 
practice. This article does not seek to address or respond to these chal-
lenges in detail, as the objective of the article is to show the centrality of 
methodology to common law constitutionalism, rather than to debate or 
establish the legitimacy of the methods used. However, three main issues 
can be briefly outlined. First, as with the principle of legality, the contested 
nature and vagueness of the principles being applied is ever-present. Ac-
cordingly, the very appeal of principles in the cross-jurisdictional sphere—
their general, abstract nature—simultaneously emerges as a challenge to 
their legitimacy. Jean Leclair, for instance, cautions that the abstract na-
ture of unwritten constitutional principles creates the risk that courts will 
sculpt the content of these principles to suit judicial preferences.148 How-
ever, the inherent vagueness and contestability of the most common and 
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fundamental constitutional norms suggests that this worry is not primarily 
about the method employed in using unwritten principles, or even unique 
to unwritten principles themselves. Vagueness is inextricably tied to con-
stitutionalism and constitutional adjudication.149 More pertinent are unset-
tled practices regarding legitimate methods of implication and the function 
played by the principle once implied. The purpose of interpretation is to 
ascertain the meaning of the text, and consequently, implication methods 
should be geared toward that objective.150 All five main methods of impli-
cation can be employed as means of discovering the intent or meaning of 
the constitutional instrument, and much depends on the judges providing 
justification for the method employed within the context of the respective 
constitution. Ultimately, judicial choice is involved in adopting a method of 
implication and determining what principles should be employed. Such 
choices can also reflect deeper—substantive—views on the part of judges 
regarding the relationship between written constitutional text and unwrit-
ten norms as well as relative institutional roles of the judiciary and the 
legislature. Variations in judicial approaches to implication can therefore 
sometimes reflect different value commitments between judges and be-
tween judicial cultures across jurisdictions.151 However, again, judicial 
choice is unavoidable in constitutional interpretation, as constitutional in-
terpretation requires “substantive evaluation”152 of vague terms.  
 Finally, the use to which the principle is put—primarily either as an 
interpretive aid or as a basis for invalidating legislation—is subject to de-
bate. Using principles as interpretive aids is more generally accepted, as 
such use poses fewer challenges to both the text of the constitution and 
democracy. Where, however, legislation is struck down for contravention of 
an implied constitutional principle, the principle can be seen as sidelining 
the constitutional text, subverting democratic will, and aggrandizing judi-
cial power. Importantly, however, this use of constitutional principles is not 
the inevitable result of implication of constitutional principles—it only 
arises in few jurisdictions and pursuant to a limited subset of principles.153 
The upshot in relation to the method of implication and the specific use of 
 
149  See James B Kelly & Michael Murphy, “Confronting Judicial Supremacy: A Defence of 
Judicial Activism and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Legal Rights Jurisprudence” 
(2001) 16:1 CJLS 3 at 10–12. 
150  Cf Goldsworthy’s distinction between “clarifying interpretation” and “creative interpre-
tation” in Goldsworthy, supra note 129 at 110–12. 
151  See Rosalind Dixon & Gabrielle Appleby, “Constitutional Implications in Australia: Ex-
plaining the Structure—Rights Dualism” in Dixon & Stone, supra note 129, 343 at 362–
67; Mark Carter, “The Rule of Law, Legal Rights in the Charter, and the Supreme 
Court’s New Positivism” (2008) 33:2 Queen’s LJ 453 at 468–70, 472–75. 
152  Aileen Kavanagh, “The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation Under 
the Human Rights Act 1998” (2004) 24:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 259 at 265.  
153  See Wheatle, Principled Reasoning, supra note 27 at 184–89. 
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unwritten principles is that the practice of implying principles into consti-
tutional text offers a range of options for constitutional interpretation and 
can thereby be adapted to fit the institutional and wider constitutional con-
text of the relevant jurisdiction. The core of the practice is a familiar 
method in common law jurisdictions, and the specific contours of the prac-
tice in each jurisdiction can be determined and adjusted in accordance with 
the features of respective constitutions.  
V.  Coherence and Common Law Methods 
 The prevalence and development of common law constitutionalist 
methods may, however, present a challenge to the coherence of the common 
law. As stated in Part II of this article, the common law is sustained by 
coherence among its constituent parts. Yet, an imbalance between meth-
odology and substantive norms has been identified as a flaw in the advance 
of common law constitutionalism in the UK.154 While the traditional incre-
mentalism of the common law restrains the growth of doctrine and sub-
stantive principle, it does not exert the same restrictions on methodology. 
The result is that though the content of the law must evolve slowly, meth-
ods continue to blossom and expand in reach while the principles and rules 
being applied by interpretive methods see relatively little development and 
definition. The result is a lack of definitional certainty to the content of the 
law that is being funnelled through increasingly powerful interpretive 
techniques.155 While such imbalance challenges the integrity of internal do-
mestic constitutional law, the potential difficulties prompted by methodol-
ogy outstripping substantive norms is less pressing for the transnational 
flow of common law constitutionalism. There is relatively little imperative 
for the content of constitutional norms to be concretely developed across 
states, as each jurisdiction retains relative freedom to create and adjust the 
moral content of its constitutional laws in accordance with the textual, in-
stitutional, and cultural context of each respective jurisdiction.  
 A more pressing challenge for the coherence of common law methods 
and the internal coherence of the constitutions of which they form part is 
the clarity of the mechanisms themselves. Both the principle of legality and 
the implication of constitutional principles include elements that are sus-
ceptible to varying interpretations and call for evaluative judgment. While 
interpretive methods are free of some of the moral contestation that accom-
pany substantive norms, they are not completely free of evaluative choices. 
For instance, both methods rely on judicial assessments of which principles 
qualify as constitutional. Accordingly, to legitimize the techniques being 
employed by courts, judges must articulate “a defined and defensible legal 
 
154  See Masterman & Wheatle, “Unity, Disunity and Vacuity”, supra note 49 at 130–35.  
155  See the limited attention to the content of the rule of law in Jackson, supra note 62 at 
paras 107 (Lord Hope), 159 (Lady Hale). 
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methodology to protect against the accusation that they are illegitimately 
imposing their own idiosyncratic values in the interpretation of legisla-
tion.”156 
 Further, each technique also challenges the role of parliamentary in-
tention and parliamentary will within constitutional interpretation.157 The 
appropriate respect to be afforded to the legislature in constitutional adju-
dication has never yielded simple answers; the constitutional project is at 
the very least agnostic about the effect of legislative will in the face of con-
stitutional requirements. The tension between constitutional precepts and 
legislative will is heightened when the precept relied upon to moderate or 
trump legislation is not expressed in the text of a constitutional document. 
These methodological techniques can accordingly be seen to pose additional 
challenges to the democratic consistency of constitutional review. Nonethe-
less, the broad acceptance of the use of these constitutional methods—de-
spite debate regarding their normative effect and which principles should 
qualify as constitutional—means that the task for courts is to shape the 
specifications of these techniques by according due respect to both demo-
cratic and constitutional imperatives. The solution, in sum, is to work to-
ward coherence within the constitutional system. The adaptability of both 
techniques and constitutional principles allows for that coherence to be 
achieved within each jurisdiction and for the mechanics of the techniques 
and the substance of principles to be continually developed and adjusted to 
meet the evolving constitutional context of a variety of common law states. 
 The transnational dimension of common law constitutionalism—partic-
ularly the commonality of methods across jurisdictions—can aid in both the 
internal reasonableness of this model of constitutionalism as well as its ac-
ceptance by other constitutional actors. The use of familiar methods by 
multiple jurisdictions solidifies their place within constitutional adjudica-
tion in common law states. Moreover, engaging with other jurisdictions and 
other judges provides a ready and continual means of checking or measur-
ing the appropriateness of these methods and updating their use in light of 
new thinking and new information. This form of comparative engagement 
speaks to Jeremy Waldron’s view that judicial comparativism contributes 
to the rationality of judicial decision-making on human rights issues.158 For 
Waldron, rationality—in the sense that likes should be treated alike—is 
enhanced by judges examining case law from other jurisdictions when 
those cases address similar issues. The underpinning idea here that similar 
 
156  Rt Hon Lord Justice Sales, “Modern Statutory Interpretation” (2017) 38:1 Stat L Rev 125 
at 131. 
157  Note, however, that constitutional principles may also protect or enhance parliamentary 
power, as seen in the nullification of the UK government’s attempted prorogation of Par-
liament in the Miller & Cherry litigation (supra note 32). 
158  See Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in American 
Courts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
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issues arise in multiple jurisdictions, thereby making their resolution in 
other countries relevant, has force in relation to engagement with both sub-
stantive law and methods.  
Conclusion 
 Exclusive focus on substantive law without attention to the impact of 
common law methodology in shaping rights and other constitutionalist de-
velopments would produce a limited understanding of the common law as 
a constitutional and transnational force. Methods and processes facilitate 
much of the endurance, transferral, and adaptability of common law con-
stitutionalism. The similarities of common law and statutory judging mean 
that adjudication under written constitutional instruments cannot be en-
tirely separated from common law adjudication. Moreover, the influence of 
path-dependent outcomes and institutional culture result in the continuing 
influence of embedded common law practices and attitudes beyond the 
adoption of written constitutionalism. Accordingly, this article argued that 
the continuing influence of embedded methodological techniques within 
common law jurisdictions helps to sustain common law constitutionalism 
both within and across jurisdictional boundaries. 
 Reflection on the development and use of two particular techniques—
the principle of legality and the implication of constitutional principles—
highlights the role of methods in common law constitutionalism but also 
reveals some of the challenges that arise. In particular, these methodolog-
ical practices provoke fundamental questions about the relative relation-
ship between written constitutions and unwritten norms and between the 
judiciary and political branches. Yet, neither the use of these methods, nor 
common law constitutionalism itself, is meant to ultimately resolve these 
persistent questions. Nor does common law constitutionalism seek to re-
place legislative power with judicial supremacy. However, there is bound 
to be continuing disquiet about the role of judges in using these methods to 
apply unwritten norms alongside a written constitution. The unwritten 
source of the limits being applied by judges to political decision-making un-
der common law constitutionalism presents a problem of democratic legit-
imacy and accountability that has not been sufficiently resolved. While this 
article did not seek to tackle this issue, it is hoped that the analysis it de-
velops will contribute to the debate on the appropriate role of the common 
law constitution and the judiciary in modern constitutional states in the 
common law world. 
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